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1. Introduction
The formation and stability of a coalition structure (or a partition) is an important and unsettled
issue in both sciences and social sciences, such as artificial intelligence (Monderer and Tennenholtz
[5]) and game theory (Shubik [8]). An obstacle in resolving this issue is that one needs to obtain the
analytical expressions of equilibrium payoffs for an arbitrary coalition structure, which often requires
one to invert matrices whose inverses are unknown. This note derives a large class of such matrices
from industrial organization whose inverses yield the strategic equilibria (or Nash equilibria [6]) in
most linear oligopoly models. Such inverses form an open problem, which includes the analytical
expression of the inverse for a general symmetric matrix.
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As a starting point to find a complete solution in future studies, the paper provides a partial solution
by inverting a non-trivial subset of the derivedmatrices. This partial solution, previously unavailable in
the literature, will be useful to other scholars in their future studies. 1 The rest of the note is organized
as follows: Section 2 defines and Section 3 derives the open problem, Sections 4 and 5 provide a partial
solution and an application, Section 6 concludes, and the appendix provides proofs.
2. Description of the problem
Given a partition (or a coalition structure or a set of multi-product firms)  = {S1, S2, . . . , Sh} of
N = {1, . . . , n}, let ni = |Si| denote the cardinality of each coalition Si (or the number of products
in Si, 1  ni  n,
∑h
i=1 ni = n), and h1 the number of its singleton coalitions (i.e., those Si with
ni = 1). Then, our main matrix B has [n + h(h + 1)/2 − h1] constants distributed as below: there
are h symmetric ni × ni submatrices Bii on the main diagonal whose diagonal entries are ak ( k ∈ Si)
and off-diagonal entries are a constant −bi (i = 1, …, h and ni  2), and h(h − 1) other submatrices
Bij = Bji with a dimension of ni×nj and an identical entry of−cij = −cji (j = 1,…, h, j = i). Precisely,
the matrix B has the following structure:
B = Bn×n =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
B11 B12 · · · B1h
B21 B22 · · · B2h
...
...
. . .
...
Bh1 Bh2 · · · Bhh
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, (1)
whose block submatrices Bii and Bij (i, j = 1, …, h, j = i) are defined as
Bii =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a î+1 −bi · · · −bi
−bi a î+2 · · · −bi
...
...
. . .
...
−bi −bi · · · a î+ni
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
ni×ni
and Bij =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−cij −cij · · · −cij
−cij −cij · · · −cij
...
...
. . .
...
−cij −cij · · · −cij
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
ni×nj
,
where î =∑i−1k=1 nk is the number of rows (or columns) preceding Bii; ak > 0 (k = 1, . . . , n), bi > 0
(i = 1, . . . , h and ni  2), and cij = cji > 0 (i, j = 1, …, h and j = i) are [n + h(h + 1)/2 − h1]
constants whose economic interpretations are provided in (5) in the next section. 2
As an example, thematrix for = {[1, 2], [3, 4], [5]}with S1 = {1, 2}, S2 = {3, 4}, and S3 = {5}
(i.e., n = 5, h = 3, n1 = 2, n2 = 2, n3 = 1, and h1 = 1) has [n + h(h + 1)/2 − h1] = [5 + 3(3 +
1)/2 − 1] = 10 constants and is given by
B5×5 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
B11 B12 B13
B21 B22 B23
B31 B32 B33
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a1 −b1 −c12 −c12 −c13
−b1 a2 −c12 −c12 −c13
−c12 −c12 a3 −b2 −c23
−c12 −c12 −b2 a4 −c23
−c13 −c13 −c23 −c23 a5
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, (2)
1 A special case of this partial solution has already been used in several recent studies such as Ishibashi [4] and Wang and Zhao
[9].
2 Note that there will be no bi in Bii if ni = 1 or Si is a singleton. The example in (2) has no b3 in B33, because of n3 = 1.
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where the submatrices are:
B11 =
⎡⎣ a1 −b1
−b1 a2
⎤⎦ , B22 =
⎡⎣ a3 −b2
−b2 a4
⎤⎦ , B33 = [a5] ,
B12 = B21 =
⎡⎣−c12 −c12
−c12 −c12
⎤⎦ , B13 = B31 =
⎡⎣−c13
−c13
⎤⎦ , and B23 = B32 =
⎡⎣−c23
−c23
⎤⎦ .
Now,ouropenproblemis tofind theanalytical expressions for the inverseofB in (1). Sinceananswer
will include the analytical expression for the inverse of a general symmetric matrix (i.e., h = h1 = n
with n(n + 1)/2 constants), there might be no solution to the open problem. However, as implied
in Sections 4 and 5, there remain large classes of partial solutions, to be discovered, that are both
non-trivial and useful in future applications.
3. Derivation of the main matrix
This section first defines a multi-product linear Bertrand oligopoly. 3 It then shows that its equilib-
rium price has the form p = B−1d, where B is the main matrix in (1) and d is a vector of constants
determined bymarket parameters. Finally, it shows that the strategic equilibria inmost, if not all, other
linear oligopoly models also have the structure of B in (1).
A multi-product linear Bertrand oligopoly with n differentiated goods is defined by three parts: (1)
n cost functions Ck(qk) = ckqk, k ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}; (2) a set of multi-product firms H = {1, . . . , h},
with firm i producing ni = |Si| products in Si ⊆ N (1  ni  n,∑hj=1 nj = n), which is equivalent to
a partition  = {S1, S2, . . . , Sh} of N; and (3) demand functions for each firm’s products given in (3)
below.
Let pk denote the price for each good k ∈ N. For each firm S = Si ∈ , let pS = {pk| k ∈ S} denote
the vector of its prices and p−S = {pk| k ∈ N\S} the vector of other firms’ prices. Given the industry’s
price p = (p1, . . . , pn) = (pS, p−S) = {pS| S ∈ }, demands for each product k ∈ Si produced by a
firm Si ∈  are
qk(p) = qk(pSi , p−Si) = V − γkkpk + γim∈Si\{k}pm + j∈H\{i}γijm∈Sj pm, (3)
where V > 0 is demand size, and γkk > 0 (k ∈ N) and 0 < γi, γij = γji  1 (i, j ∈ H, i = j) are
substitution parameters. 4 Now, the profit for each firm S ∈  is equal to πS(p) = πS(pS, p−S) =
k∈S(pk − ck)qk(p), with qk(p) as given in (3).
Strategic behavior assumes that each firm chooses a best response, or that it takes the prices of
other firms as given and chooses its prices to maximize its profit. Precisely, a strategic equilibrium (or
Bertrand–Nash equilibrium [1,6]) is a price vector p∗ = {p∗S | S ∈ } such that p∗S is a solution ofMax{πS(pS, p∗−S)| pS  0} for each S ∈ . Under usual assumptions (e.g., a unique solution exists), such
equilibrium price solves the following h sets of first order conditions:
∂πSi(p)
∂pk
= 0, all k ∈ Si and for each Si ∈ , or Bp = d, (4)
3 Bertrand oligopoly [1] (or oligopoly under price competition) assumes that each firm’s choices are the prices of its products. In
contrast, Cournot oligopoly [2] (or oligopoly under quantity competition) assumes that each firm’s choices are the quantities of its
products.
4 Note that internal substitution within a firm i has identical rate γi (i.e., between any m and t ∈ Si), and external substitution
between two firms i = j has identical rate γij among all of their products (i.e., between anym ∈ Si and t ∈ Sj).
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where B is the same as in (1) with5
ak = 2γkk, bi = 2γi, cij = γij, d = {dSi | Si ∈ } with
dSi = {dk| k ∈ Si}, where dk = V + γkkck − γim∈Si\{k}cm
(5)
for all k ∈ Si and each Si ∈ .
Below we discuss ten classes of important linear oligopoly models whose strategic equilibria all
have the same structure of (1). Note that Bertrandequilibriawith single-product firms (i.e.,whenh = n
in (3)) are often called premerger Bertrand equilibria. Because the most general single-product model
(i.e., with n(n − 1)/2 substitution parameters) remains as an open problem, most merger studies in
Bertrand oligopoly use the simplified models of Shubik [7] (as in cases 1 and 2 below) or Dixit [3].
Case 1. Simultaneous mergers without synergy. Let πk(p) = (pk − ck)qk(p) be firm k’s profit, with
qk(p) as the Shubik demand in (10). Now, let a partition  = {S1, S2, . . . , Sh} of N denote a set of h
simultaneousmergers fromthepremergerequilibriump0 = {p0i | i ∈ N} (i.e.,p0i ∈ArgMax {πi(pi, p0−i)|
pi  0}, all i), and assume that the profit function for each merger S ∈  is
πS(p) = k∈S(pk − ck)qk(p). (6)
Then, p∗ = B−1d in (4) becomes a postmerger equilibrium without synergy.
Case 2. Simultaneous mergers with weak cost-synergy. This is the same as case 1 except that
πS(p) = k∈S(pk − cS)qk(p) (7)
for each S ∈ , where cS = Min{ck| k ∈ S}. Note that cases 1 and 2 will become two new merger
models when the demand in (6–7) is replaced by the Dixit demand in (9).
Case 3. Simultaneous mergers with marketing-synergy. Start with h = n in (3), and assume that each
merger S ∈  = {S1, S2, . . . , Sh} generates the following form of marketing-synergy: for each i and
each j = i ∈ H, let
γi = Max{γkm|k = m ∈ Si}, and γij = γji ≡ Min{γkm|k ∈ Si,m ∈ Sj}, (8)
which reduces (increases) the positive effects of a price increase on other firms’ demand (demands for
the firm’s other products). Now, (3) becomes the demands for products sold by each merger S ∈ ,
and p∗ = B−1d in (4) becomes a new postmerger equilibrium with marketing-synergy.
Case 4. Dixit demand system ([3], 1979):
qk(p) = V − pk + γm =kpm, all k ∈ N. (9)
This is a special case of (3) when h = n (or there is no γi), γkk ≡ 1 and γij ≡ γ (i = j, k ∈ N),
which follows from a simple utility maximization problem.6 The solution p∗ = B−1d in (4) now is a
premerger equilibrium with single-product firms.
Case 5. Shubik demand system ([7], 1980):
qk(p) = V − pk − γ (pk − p), all k ∈ N, (10)
where p = (pm)/n is the average price. This is another special case of (3) (h = n, γkk ≡ [n + (n −
1)γ ]/n, γij ≡ γ /n, i = j, k ∈ N). It yields a different premerger equilibrium with single-product
firms, and it has the advantage of being intuitive: a firm kwill be penalized (rewarded) by an amount
equal to γ |pk − p| when it charges more (less) than the average price or when (pk − p) > 0 (< 0).
5 The above conditions can be rearranged as: for each Si ∈ , and for all k ∈ Si ,
2γkkpk − 2γim∈Si\{k}pm − j∈H\{i}γijm∈Sj pm = V + γkkck − γim∈Si\{k}cm,
which leads to Bp = d, whose parameters are given in (5).
6 Let In×n be the identity matrix, En×n the matrix of ones, G = (1 − γ )In×n + γ En×n , and U(q, y) = y + Vqm − qGq/2 the
utility, where y is a composite measure of all other consumptions. Then, Max
{
U(q, y)|pq + y  Y
}
yields the inverse version of
(9), where Y is fixed income.
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Below we briefly show that strategic equilibria in most linear Cournot (or quantity-setting)
oligopolies also have the structure of (1). Given a set of firms H = {1, . . . , h} or = {S1, S2, . . . , Sh},
let q = (qS, q−S) = {qS| S ∈ } be the vector of all products,
pk(q) = V̂ − γ̂kkqk − γ̂im∈Si\{k}qm − j∈H\{i}γ̂ijm∈Sj qm, all k ∈ Si, (11)
be the inverse demand for the products of each firm Si ∈  (γ̂kk, γ̂i, γ̂ij > 0, k ∈ N, i = j ∈ H),
πS(qS, q−S) = k∈S(pk(q) − ck)qk be the profit of each S ∈ , and q∗ = {q∗S | S ∈ } be the
strategic equilibrium (or Cournot–Nash equilibrium [2,6]) such that each q∗S is a best response to q∗−S
(i.e., q∗S ∈ ArgMax{πS(qS, q∗−S)|qS  0}). Then, under usual conditions, such equilibrium supply is
uniquely determined by
∂πS(qS, q−S)
∂qk
= 0, for all k ∈ S and each S ∈ , or Bq = d, (12)
where B has the same structure of B in (1). Cases 6–10 in (13) below are respectively the Cournot
equivalent of cases 1–5 in equations (6–10):
Case 6. πS(q) = k∈S(pk(q) − ck)qk, all S ∈ ;
Case 7. πS(q) = k∈S(pk(q) − cS)qk, all S ∈ ;
Case 8. γ̂i=Min{γ̂km|k = m ∈ Si}, γ̂ij= γ̂ji ≡ Max{γ̂km|k ∈ Si,m ∈ Sj};
Case 9. pk(q) = V̂ − qk − γ̂ m =kqm, all k ∈ N;
Case 10. pk(q) = V̂ − qk + γ̂ (qk − q), all k ∈ N,
(13)
where q = ∑ qj/n in case 10 is the average output, and synergy in case 8 reduces (increases) the
negative effects of an output increase on own (other firms’) profits.
The details of these five important classes of quantity-settingmodels are skipped as they are similar
to the earlier price-settingmodel (3). It is useful to note thatmost Cournotmodels in (13) and Bertrand
models in (6–10) can be inverted from each other. For example, inverting the Shubik system in (10)
yields the inverse demand in case 10, with V̂ = V and γ̂ = γ /(1 + γ ).
4. A partial solution7
Consider the class of B in (1) given by: ak ≡ a, all k, bi ≡ b and cij = cji ≡ c, all i = j. Denote such
matrices by
A = An×n =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
A11 A12 · · · A1h
A21 A22 · · · A2h
...
...
. . .
...
Ah1 Ah2 · · · Ahh
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , (14)
where
Aii =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a −b · · · −b
−b a · · · −b
...
...
. . .
...
−b −b · · · a
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
ni×ni
and Aij =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−c −c · · · −c
−c −c · · · −c
...
...
. . .
...
−c −c · · · −c
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
ni×nj
.
7 I am indebted to Eric Howe for allowingme to report themain results of this section,which had been circulated in an unpublished
note, titled “Merger incentives and inverse matrices from Bertrand competition,” by E. Howe and J. Zhao (2004).
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The analytic expressions of A−1 are given as a theorem below. 8
Theorem 1. Let U = (uij)n×n = A−1 denote the inverse of A given in (14), for i = 1, . . . , h, define
βi =
(
ni + a + (1 − ni)b
c
)−1
= c
a + b + (c − b)ni ;
α =
h∑
i=1
βini = c
h∑
i=1
ni
a + b + (c − b)ni , (15)
θi = 1
1 − α
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝βini + cb
h∑
j=1
j =i
βjnj
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ = 11 − α
(
βini + c
b
(α − βini)
)
, and
assume α = 1 and a + b + (c − b)ni = 0, all i. Then, U = A−1 =
1
a + b I +
1
c(a + b)
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
bβ1(1 + θ1)En1×n1 β1(c + bθ2)En1×n2 · · · β1(c + bθh)En1×nh
β2(c + bθ1)En2×n1 bβ2(1 + θ2)En2×n2 · · · β2(c + bθh)En2×nh
...
...
. . .
...
βh(c + bθ1)Enh×n1 βh(c + bθ2)Enh×n2 · · · bβh(1 + θh)Enh×nh
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , (16)
where I is the identity matrix and Eni×nj is an ni × nj matrix of 1’s.
Although it is quite involved to verify UA = AU = I, it is easy to verify (16) by three cases of A: (1)
h = n or ni = 1 for all i; (2) h = 1 or n1 = n, and replace b by c; and (3) 1 < h < n and replace b by
c, then using the simple matrix of (29), which is the inverse of D in (27) in appendix.
Applying (c + bθj) = (a + b)βj/(1 − α), A−1 in (16) can be rearranged as
A−1 = U =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
U11 U12 · · · U1h
U21 U22 · · · U2h
...
...
. . .
...
Uh1 Uh2 · · · Uhh
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
1
a + b I +
1
c
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
bβ1(1+θ1)
(a+b) En1×n1
β1β2
(1−α)En1×n2 · · · β1βh(1−α)En1×nh
β2β1
(1−α)En2×n1
bβ2(1+θ2)
(a+b) En2×n2 · · · β2βh(1−α)En2×nh
...
...
. . .
...
βhβ1
(1−α)Enh×n1
βhβ2
(1−α)Enh×n2 · · · bβh(1+θh)(a+b) Enh×nh
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , (17)
where for each i = 1, …, h and all j = i, j = 1, . . . , h,
Uii = 1
a + b Ini×ni +
bβi(1 + θi)
c(a + b) Eni×ni ,
Uij = βi(c + bθj)
c(a + b) Eni×nj =
βiβj
c(1 − α)Eni×nj .
By (17), A−1 is symmetric and has the same block structure of A.
8 Note that A−1 exists under the usual conditions of the underlying oligopoly models. For example, given the values of a, b and c
in (5), it is easy to show α < 1/2 and a + b + (c − b)ni > 2(1 + γ ), which guarantee the conditions for the existence of A−1 in
Theorem 1.
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5. Applications: the premerger and postmerger Bertrand equilibria
Given the above expressions of A−1 in (16), it is straightforward, though often quite involved, to
calculate the Bertrand equilibrium p∗ = B−1d in (4) with three substitution rates (i.e., γkk ≡ a/2,
γi ≡ b/2 and γij ≡ c) or Cournot equilibrium q = B−1d in (12) with three substitution rates. This
section calculates, as an example of applications, the postmerger equilibria for = {S, t + 1, . . . , n}
with no synergy using both Dixit and Shubik demands in (9–10). Without loss of generality, assume
c1 c2  · · ·  ct , so cS = c1; and assume Assumption A0 below, which guarantees positive outputs
for all firms at both premerger and postmerger equilibria.
A0 (Assumption 0): For each S = {1, . . . , t},
nV + (n + (n − t)γ )cS + γ (n − t)c−S
(2n + (2n − 2t)γ ) > cS (18)
holds, where cS = ∑i∈S ci/t and c−S = ∑i/∈S ci/(n − t).
We first provide the postmerger equilibrium for case 1 in (6), which uses the Shubik demand in
(10).
Theorem 2. Let p∗ be the postmerger equilibrium for S = {1, . . . , t} with no synergy in (6), cS and c−S
be given in (18). Then, for k = 1, . . . , t and j = t + 1, . . . , n,
p∗k =
n(2n(1 + γ ) − γ )V
ω0
+ γ
2t (n − t) cS
2ω0
+ (n − t)γ (n(1 + γ ) − γ )c−S
ω0
+ ck
2
,
p∗j =
n(2n(1 + γ ) − tγ )V
ω0
+ tγ (n(1 + γ ) − tγ ) cS
ω0
(19)
+γ (n − t) (n(1 + γ ) − γ ) (2n(1 + γ ) − tγ ) c−S
(2n(1 + γ ) − γ )ω0 +
(n(1 + γ ) − γ )cj
2n(1 + γ ) − γ ,
where ω0 = γ 2 (n − t) (t + 2n − 2) + 2nγ (3n − t − 1) + 4n2.
Now, let t = 1 and ci = c1(i ∈ S) in (19) respectively, one gets the premerger equilibrium and
postmerger equilibrium with weak cost-synergy as given below:
Corollary 1. Let p∗∗ be the postmerger equilibrium for S = {1, . . . , t} with weak cost-synergy, p0 be the
premerger equilibrium, and c = (∑nj=1 cj)/n. Then, for k = 1, . . . , t, j = t + 1, . . . , n, and all i,
p∗∗k =
n(2n(1 + γ ) − γ )V
ω0
+ (n − t)γ (n(1 + γ ) − γ )c−S
ω0
+ (γ
2t (n − t) + ω0)c1
2ω0
,
p∗∗j =
n(2n(1 + γ ) − tγ )V
ω0
+ tγ (n(1 + γ ) − tγ ) c1
ω0
(20)
+γ (n − t) (n(1 + γ ) − γ ) (2n(1 + γ ) − tγ ) c−S
(2n(1 + γ ) − γ )ω0 +
(n(1 + γ ) − γ )cj
2n(1 + γ ) − γ ;
p0i =
n(V − c)
n(2 + γ ) − γ +
n (γ + 1) c
2n(1 + γ ) − γ +
(n(1 + γ ) − γ )ci
2n(1 + γ ) − γ ,
where ω0, cS and c−S are the same as that in Theorem 2.
Next, we provide the postmerger equilibrium for case 1 using Dixit demand in (9).
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Theorem 3. Let pD∗ be the postmerger equilibrium for S = {1, . . . , t} with no synergy in (6) using Dixit
demand in (9). Then, for k = 1, . . . , t and j = t + 1, . . . , n,
pD∗k =
(γ + 2) V
ωD0
+ t (n − t) γ
2cS
2ωD0
+ γ (n − t) c−S
ωD0
+ ck
2
, (21)
pD∗j =
(2 − (t − 2)γ ) V
ωD0
+ γ t (1 − (t − 1)γ ) cS
ωD0
+ γ (n − t) (2 − (t − 2) γ ) c−S
(2 + γ ) ωD0
+ cj
2 + γ ,
where ωD0 = [t(n − t) − 2(n − 1)] γ 2 − 2 (n + t − 3) γ + 4.
Finally, let t = 1 and ci = c1(i ∈ S) in (21) respectively, one gets the premerger equilibrium and
postmerger equilibrium with weak cost-synergy as given below:
Corollary 2. Let pD∗∗ be the postmerger equilibrium for S = {1, . . . , t} with weak cost-synergy and pD0
the premerger equilibrium using Dixit demand in (9). Then, for k = 1, . . . , t, j = t + 1, . . . , n, and all i,
pD∗∗k =
(γ + 2) V
ωD0
+ γ (n − t) c−S
ωD0
+
[
(t (n − t) − (n − 1)) γ 2 − (t + n − 3) γ + 2
]
c1
ωD0
,
pD∗∗j =
(2 − (t − 2)γ ) V
ωD0
+γ t (1 − (t − 1)γ ) c1
ωD0
+γ (n − t) (2 − (t − 2) γ ) c−S
(2 + γ ) ωD0
+ cj
2 + γ ;
pD0i =
V − c
2 − (n − 1) γ +
(2 + (n + 1) γ ) c
(2 + γ ) (2 − (n − 1) γ ) +
ci
2 + γ , (22)
where ωD0 is the same as that in Theorem 3.
6. Conclusion and discussion
The above analysis has formulated a large class of matrices whose inverses yield the strategic equi-
libria in most linear oligopoly models. A complete understanding of these matrices remains unknown
and their properties form a long list of open problems: the analytical expressions of their inverses,
their eigenvalues and eigenvectors, their rank correction properties, and how these properties are
determined by the partitions.
The author hopes that readerswill bemotivated and challenged to investigate these openproblems,
in particular, to obtain more partial solutions or calculate more nontrivial sets of the inverses based
on a particular set of models in industrial organization or networks, or on a particular set of partitions,
or a particular set of parameters, which might someday lead to a complete answer in the future.
Appendix. Proofs
Our proof of Theorem 1 uses the following Lemma 1, which is also used to verify the main inverse.
Let S = (sij)h×h = F−1 denote the inverse of the following matrix
F = (fij)h×h =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a1 −n2 · · · −nh
−n1 a2 · · · −nh
...
...
. . .
...
−n1 −n2 · · · ah
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , (23)
where for each j = 1, . . . , h, fjj = aj > 0, and fij = −nj < 0 for all i = j.
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Lemma 1. Given the above F in (23), define α = ∑hi=1(ni/(ai + ni)) and suppose α = 1. Then, the
inverse of F is given by S =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
a1+n1 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 1
ah+nh
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠+ 1(1 − α)
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
n1
(a1+n1)2
n2
(a1+n1)(a2+n2) · · · nh(a1+n1)(ah+nh)
n1
(a2+n2)(a1+n1)
n2
(a2+n2)2 · · ·
nh
(a2+n2)(ah+nh)
...
...
. . .
...
n1
(ah+nh)(a1+n1)
n2
(ah+nh)(a2+n2) · · · nh(ah+nh)2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , (24)
where
sii = 1
ai + ni +
ni
(1 − α)(ai + ni)2 , for all i; (25)
sij = nj
(1 − α)(ai + ni)(aj + nj) , for all i = j. (26)
Proof of Lemma 1. Let eh be a h-dimensional column vector of 1’s, Xh×1 = eh, Y1×h = (−n1,
. . . ,−nh), and Bh×h be a diagonal matrix with bii = ai + ni, all i. By F = B + XY and the Sherman–
Morrison–Woodbury formula, F−1 = B−1 − B−1X(I + YB−1X)−1YB−1. Using (I + YB−1X)−1 =
1/(1 − α), one gets B−1X(I + YB−1X)−1YB−1 =
−1
(1 − α)
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
n1
(a1+n1)2
n2
(a1+n1)(a2+n2) · · · nh(a1+n1)(ah+nh)
n1
(a2+n2)(a1+n1)
n2
(a2+n2)2 · · ·
nh
(a2+n2)(ah+nh)
...
...
. . .
...
n1
(ah+nh)(a1+n1)
n2
(ah+nh)(a2+n2) · · · nh(ah+nh)2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
which leads to (24). 
Letting h = n and ni = c for all i in (23–24) leads to the corollary below, a special case of which is
used in verifying the main inverse in (16).
Corollary 3. Let R = (rij)n×n = D−1 denote the inverse of D given by
D = (dij)n×n =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a1 −c · · · −c
−c a2 · · · −c
...
...
. . .
...
−c −c · · · an
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , (27)
where dii = ai, dij = −c, all i = j. Suppose α =∑ni=1 c/(ai + c) = 1. Then, R =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
a1+c · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 1
an+c
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠+ c(1 − α)
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
(a1+c)2
1
(a1+c)(a2+c) · · · 1(a1+c)(an+c)
1
(a2+c)(a1+c)
1
(a2+c)2 · · · 1(a2+c)(an+c)
...
...
. . .
...
1
(an+c)(a1+c)
1
(an+c)(a2+c) · · · 1(an+c)2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , (28)
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where
rii = 1
ai + c +
c
(1 − α)(ai + c)2 , for all i;
rij = c
(1 − α)(ai + c)(aj + c) , for all i = j.
When ai = a for all i, the above inverse matrix becomes
D−1 = 1
a + c
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
I + c
a − (h − 1)c
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 · · · 1
...
. . .
...
1 · · · 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
= 1
a + c G =
1
a + c {gij}h×h, (29)
where gii = [a − (h − 2)c] / [a − (h − 1)c], gij = c/ [a − (h − 1)c] , all j = i, which is useful to
verify the main result of (16). We are now ready to prove the main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1. Define Bn×n = (a + b)In×n,where In×n is the n × n identity matrix. For each
i = 1, . . . , h, define Xi = (−b)eni ,where eh is a h-dimensional column vector of 1’s; Yi = eni ,
Yij = cb enj for all j = i, and
Xn×h =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
X1 0 · · · 0
0 X2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · Xh
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , Yh×n =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Y1 Y12 · · · Y1h
Y21 Y2 · · · Y2h
...
...
. . .
...
Yh1 Yh2 · · · Yh
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
where the 0’s are column vector of zeros with the appropriate dimensions. Then, one sees A =
B+XY, so A is a rank h adjustment of B. In order to compute A−1 = B−1−B−1X(I+YB−1X)−1YB−1,
one needs to obtain F−1 with
F = I + YB−1X = c
a + b
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a+(1−n1)b
c
−n2 · · · −nh
−n1 a+(1−n2)bc · · · −nh
...
...
. . .
...
−n1 −n2 · · · a+(1−nh)bc
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
h×h
.
Now, using the formula for F−1 in Lemma 1 or in (24–26), one has
F−1 = a + b
c
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
β1 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · βh
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠+ 11 − α
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
n1β
2
1 n2β1β2 · · · nhβ1βh
n1β2β1 n2β
2
2 · · · nhβ2βh
...
...
. . .
...
n1βhβ1 n2βhβ2 · · · nhβ2h
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
.
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Note that B−1X = 1
a+bX and YB
−1 = 1
a+bY . Thus
B−1XF−1YB−1= −1
c(a+b)
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
bβ1(1 + θ1)En1×n1 β1(c + bθ2)En1×n2 · · · β1(c + bθh)En1×nh
β2(c + bθ1)En2×n1 bβ2(1 + θ2)En2×n2 · · · β2(c + bθh)En2×nh
...
...
. . .
...
βh(c + bθ1)Enh×n1 βh(c + bθ2)Enh×n2 · · · bβh(1 + θh)Enh×nh
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
which leads to the formula in (16). 
The proof of Theorem 2 involves the following special case of A in (14) with = {S, t + 1, . . . , n}
(i.e., n1 = t and nj = 1 for all j = 2, …, h = n − t + 1):
A = An×n =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a · · · −b −c · · · −c
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
−b · · · a −c · · · −c
−c · · · −c a · · · −c
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
−c · · · −c −c · · · a
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, (30)
whose inverse is given as a corollary below.
Corollary 4. The inverse of the above A in (30) is given by
A−1 =
⎛⎝ 1a+b It×t 0
0 1
a+c I(n−t)×(n−t)
⎞⎠+ 1
ω0
⎛⎝ ω1a+b Et×t cEt×(n−t)
cE(n−t)×t ω2a+c E(n−t)×(n−t)
⎞⎠ , (31)
where ω0 = 0 is assumed, and ω0, ω1 and ω2 are given by
ω0 = [a − b(t − 1)] [a − c(n − t − 1)] − tc2(n − t),
ω1 = b [a − c(n − t − 1)] + c2(n − t), (32)
ω2 = c [a + b + t (c − b)] .
Proof of Corollary 4. Given A in (30), (15) become:
β1 = c
a + b − t(b − c) , and βi = β =
c
a + c for i = 2, . . . , h = n − t + 1;
α = tc
a + b − t(b − c) +
c(n − t)
a + c ,
θ1 = 1
1 − α
[
tc
a + b − t(b − c) +
(n − t)c2
b(a + c)
]
, and for i = 2, . . . , h,
θi = θ = 1
1 − α
{
c
a + c +
c
b
[
tc
a + b − t(b − c) +
c(n − t − 1)
a + c
]}
.
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Substituting into (17), one gets: A−1 =
1
a + b I +
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
bβ1(1+θ1)
(a+b)c Et×t
β1
(a+c)(1−α)Et×1 · · · β1(a+c)(1−α)Et×1
β1
(a+c)(1−α)E1×t
b(1+θ)
(a+b)(a+c) · · · c(a+c)2(1−α)
...
...
. . .
...
β1
(a+c)(1−α)E1×t
c
(a+c)2(1−α) · · · b(1+θ)(a+b)(a+c)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
Simplifying the above expressions with a, βi and θi yields (31–32). 
Proof of Theorem 2. For i = 1, . . . , t, j = t + 1, . . . , n, the equations in (4) become: ∂(∑k∈S πk)/
∂pi = 0 and ∂πj/∂pj = 0, which can be rearranged as⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
2δ · · · −2γ −γ · · · −γ
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
−2γ · · · 2δ −γ · · · −γ
−γ · · · −γ 2δ · · · −γ
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
−γ · · · −γ −γ · · · 2δ
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
p1
p2
...
pn
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
nV + δc1 − γ ∑j=tj=2 cj
...
nV + δct − γ ∑j=t−1j=1 cj
nV + δct+1
...
nV + δcn
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, (33)
where δ = n(1 + γ ) − γ , di = nV + δci − γj∈S\icj, i ∈ S; = nV + δci, i /∈ S. Note that (33) is
actually (4) multiplied by n or nAp = nd. Solving for p by (31) with a = 2δ, b = 2γ , c = γ , one gets
p∗ = A−1d =⎛⎝ 12δ+2γ It×t 0
0 1
2δ+γ I(n−t)×(n−t)
⎞⎠ d + 1
ω0
⎛⎝ ω12δ+2γ Et×t γ Et×(n−t)
γ E(n−t)×t ω22δ+γ E(n−t)×(n−t)
⎞⎠ d,
whereω0 = γ 2 (n − t) (t + 2n − 2)+2nγ (3n − t − 1)+4n2,ω1 = γ 2 (t + 3n − 2)+4nγ and
ω2 = 2nγ (1+ γ )− tγ 2. Substitutingω1,ω2 and δ = n(1+ γ )− γ into above equations, one has:
p∗ = A−1d =⎛⎝ 12n(γ+1) It 0
0 1
2n(1+γ )−γ In−t
⎞⎠ d +
⎛⎝ γ (n(4+3γ )+(t−2)γ )2n(γ+1)ω0 Et×t γω0 Et×(n−t)
γ
ω0
E(n−t)×t γ (2n(1+γ )−tγ )(2n(1+γ )−γ )ω0 E(n−t)×(n−t)
⎞⎠ d.
By collecting terms for V, ci,
∑t
1 ck and
∑n
t+1 ck, one gets (19). 
Proof of Theorem 3. Using the Dixit demand in (9), our first order conditions can be rearranged as⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 · · · −2γ −γ · · · −γ
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
−2γ · · · 2 −γ · · · −γ
−γ · · · −γ 2 · · · −γ
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
−γ · · · −γ −γ · · · 2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
p1
p2
...
pn
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
V + (1 + γ )c1 − γ ∑j=tj=1 cj
...
V + (1 + γ )ct − γ ∑j=tj=1 cj
V + ct+1
...
V + cn
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
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Solving for p by (31)with a = 2, b = 2γ , c = γ ; di = V+(1+γ )ci−γj∈Scj, i ∈ S, and di = V+ci,
i /∈ S, one gets 9 p = A−1d =⎛⎝ 12(1+γ ) It×t 0
0 1
2+γ I(n−t)×(n−t)
⎞⎠ d + 1
ωD0
⎛⎜⎝ ω
D
1
2(1+γ )Et×t γ Et×(n−t)
γ E(n−t)×t ω
D
2
2+γ E(n−t)×(n−t)
⎞⎟⎠ d =
⎛⎝ 12(1+γ ) It×t 0
0 1
2+γ I(n−t)×(n−t)
⎞⎠ d +
⎛⎜⎝ −(n−2−t)γ
2+4γ
2(1+γ )ωD0 Et×t
γ
ωD0
Et×(n−t)
γ
ωD0
E(n−t)×t (2−t)γ
2+2γ
(2+γ )ωD0 E(n−t)×(n−t)
⎞⎟⎠ d,
where ωD0 = (t(n − t) − 2(n − 1)) γ 2 − 2 (n + t − 3) γ + 4, ωD1 = − (n − 2 − t) γ 2 + 4γ and
ωD2 = (2 − t) γ 2 + 2γ . By collecting terms for V, ci,
∑t
1 ck and
∑n
t+1 ck, one gets (21). 
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